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Élisabeth Roudinesco identifies the publication of Foucault’s The Order of Things 
(hereafter OT) in April, 1966 with the point of “entry of the mass media on the 
stage of theory.” “Journalists,” she notes, “would soon feel authorized to trans-
form structuralist intellectuals into charismatic stars, glorifying—or stigmatiz-
ing—the complexity of discourses they in any event referred to as ‘esoteric’.”3 
Within this novel arrangement, the closing lines of OT—infamously signalling an 
imminent “death of man” with the wager that man would soon “be erased, like 
a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”4—offered an easily consumable en-
capsulation of the text’s anti-humanist sentiment, taking root in the sympathetic 
context of 1960s Paris, and in turn catapulting Foucault’s image above headlines 
screaming of “the greatest revolution since existentialism.”5
Si l’Etre est surhumain, l’Un est l’homme 
condamné à l’humain.
—François Laruelle, “Mon 
Parménide”2
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Although Foucault’s subsequent position as the most prominent figure of French 
anti-humanism was due in no small part to the media’s uptake of the “death of 
man,” within a year he would come to take issue with the concept’s development 
into “something of a slogan”,6 indissociable from what he would later term “the 
most difficult, the most tiresome book [he] ever wrote.” In becoming such a slo-
gan, the concept had been so dislocated from Foucault’s complex discussion that 
he entertained withdrawing OT altogether from further publication.7 In a telling 
interview given in 1967, Foucault found himself forced to remind a largely adoring 
public that whilst “[i]t is obvious that in saying […] that man has ceased to exist 
I absolutely did not mean that man, as a living or social species, has disappeared 
from the planet.”8 He became “increasingly irritated by the uncomprehending en-
thusiasm of his large new public,” but also “by the equally uncomprehending ani-
mosity of a growing number of critics.”9 That Jean-Paul Sartre was key amongst 
these critics indicates the high stakes of the debate surrounding the death of man. 
In what was to become a public tête-à-tête between the two most prominent rep-
resentatives of the respectively humanist and anti-humanist schools of thought, 
Sartre responded to OT in an interview published in L’Arc, attempting to figure 
his own project as having already declared, after Marx, the death of man as a “sort 
of substantial I.” In turn, he cast Foucault as not only having missed the boat by 
quite a long shot, but failing to account for Sartre’s own figuration of the subject 
as surging negativity.10 
Foucault, perhaps rueing his decision to remove late passages directly criticizing 
Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason from the final manuscript of OT, drew on the 
latter in repeatedly casting Sartre in the mould of the “19th century philosopher,” 
“vehemently dissociat[ing] himself from Sartre and his era” in a 1968 interview, 
and in particular with the manner “in which a philosophical text, a theoretical 
text, finally had to tell you what life, death, and sexuality were, if God existed or 
not, what freedom consisted of, what had to do in political life, how to behave in 
regard to others and so forth.”11 The notion of man in this debate thus remained 
less an explicitly contested notion than an empty cavity, open for each partici-
pant to fill with their particular formulations so as to in turn chastise the other 
side.12 “[T]he debate about the death of man,” as Béatrice Han-Pile notes, “was 
not a genuine dialog but rather a case of philosophers talking (voluntarily or not) 
at cross purposes.” It was then notable for “provid[ing] a contrario insight into 
the nature of real philosophical exchange” as nothing more than “an exercise in 
solipsism”13—a point that the conclusion to Foucault’s subsequent book, The Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge, illustrates most strikingly, in its staging of a dialogue “as 
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a kind of drama: an extended encounter between a figure who is clearly Foucault, 
and a hostile interlocutor” clearly identifiable as Sartre.14 
The contemporary intervention of the “non-humanism” of François Laruelle into 
this debate on the death of man (which must be marked as a highly gendered 
and largely obsolete term within Anglophone scholarship, albeit one that still re-
tains a great deal of philosophical and historiographical import) takes as its point 
of departure both this particular insufficiency of the philosophical approach to 
the question of man, and the dictatorial aspect of philosophy itself. In his es-
say ‘A Rigorous Science of Man’ from his so-called Philosophy II period, Laruelle 
grounds his approach in the axiomatic assertion that man is a priori foreclosed 
to philosophy as an object of thought, leaving each philosophical attempt to ap-
propriate him as merely symptomatic of an age-old attempt to appropriate a real 
lying outside its purview. Laruelle instead explicitly refuses to “confus[e] the end 
of man with the decomposition of humanism,”15 by developing a “rigorous sci-
ence of man” concerned with the description of “phenomena lived by ordinary 
man, phenomena that are invisible, in principle, to philosophy”.16 It is the task 
of this article to consider Laruelle’s non-philosophical intervention by detailing 
Laruelle’s position vis-a-vis both sides of the humanism/anti-humanism “divide.” 
It will focus in particular on Laruelle’s relation to the Foucauldian critique, which 
probably remains the most prominent instance of anti-humanism.
FRENCH ANTI-HUMANISM
The roots of the distinct notion of humanism at stake in these developments can 
arguably be traced back as far as the Age of Enlightenment, although they are per-
haps more clearly manifest in the left-Hegelianism of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl 
Marx (especially in the latter’s concepts of labour alienation and species-being 
as they occur in his so-called “early works”). However, its modern continental 
architect is clearly Sartre, whose phenomenological account of existence effec-
tively rescues and reappropriates theological attributes that were once given to 
God exclusively so that it might establish the preeminent freedom of man, the 
individual human being. Sartre himself traces this legacy of humanism back to the 
work of René Descartes, who he claims provides “a splendid humanistic affirma-
tion of creative freedom, which […] forces us to assume a fearful task, our task par 
excellence, namely, to cause a truth to exist in the world, to act so that the world 
is true.”17
288 · sutherland and patsoura  
Equating freedom and creation, in arguing that divine freedom “is pure produc-
tivity […] the extra-temporal and eternal act by which God brings into being a 
world,” Sartre suggests that it is precisely this freedom which forms the founda-
tion of all truth.18 The guiding principle of humanism, he declares, is that “man is 
the being as a result of whose appearance a world exists,” envisaging the human 
individual as constantly but futilely moving toward a state of completion: the ens 
causa sui of productive divinity.19 As Vincent Descombes notes, the “distinctive 
feature of humanism is this will to recovery and reappropriation of divine attri-
butes, amongst them the most precious of all, the power to create and to ‘bring 
the world into existence’,” finding meaning and value in the freedom of the in-
dividual to take responsibility for their behaviour within the constraints of their 
own facticity, and thus emphasizing the originarity of existence over essence, un-
derstanding the latter as a continual project toward which one works, rather than 
a predetermined ideal from which one individuates.20 “[I]f God does not exist,” 
writes Sartre, “there is at least one being whose existence comes before its es-
sence, a being before it can be defined by any conception of it.”21
Sartre’s philosophy, enormously influential at the time—both within the intel-
lectual milieu of France and in broader Western thought—draws upon the phe-
nomenology of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in order to describe what 
he considers a distinctly non-metaphysical, existentialist ontology. As he writes 
in Being and Nothingness, “ontology appears to us capable of being defined as the 
specification of the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality,” whereas 
metaphysics raises the question of “the existence of the existent,” such that the 
former merely attempts to describe the nature of being as it appears to conscious-
ness, whilst the latter strives to explain the origin of such a structure.22 Yet, as we 
have seen, Sartre’s intense popularity also brought with it an acute scrutiny of 
his philosophy, beginning with Heidegger himself, who in the Letter on Human-
ism disavows Sartre’s interpretations, criticizing him for falling into the trap of 
understanding humanity as “determined with regard to an already established 
interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of 
beings as a whole.”23
For Heidegger, who argues that humanism proper actually first emerges in the Ro-
man Republic, the self-proclaimed existentialism and humanism of Sartre’s proj-
ect is at odds with his own fundamental ontology from which it is partly derived: 
the swapping of existence and essence from their traditional Platonic formulation 
is inadequate for escaping the strictures of metaphysics and onto-theology.24 As 
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Heidegger writes, “the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysi-
cal statement”—for it still suppresses the question of the destiny of Being, and 
masks the essence of man qua ek-sistence.25 Humanism, according to Heidegger’s 
account, universalizes a false image of man—following the tendency of all hu-
manisms to presuppose “the most universal ‘essence’ of man to be obvious”—as 
an autonomous being, luxuriating in its own freedom. Heidegger, by contrast, at-
tempts to think Dasein as necessarily shackled to the ecstatic time of ek-sistence, 
and thus thrown into specific social and historical circumstances over which it 
does not and cannot have full control.26
In the aftermath of Heidegger’s rather pointed critique, a number of French phi-
losophers (the cohort that we would typically now designate the structuralists and 
post-structuralists) leapt at the opportunity to denounce Sartre, the great intel-
lectual star of the rive gauche, and more specifically to demonstrate the extent 
to which their own approaches were able to overcome the dogma of humanism. 
One might interpret such battles as symptomatic of the broader contestations by 
which the terrain of philosophical discourse is mapped out, an auto-warfare that 
challenges the dictates of individual philosophers in order to shore up the pre-
dominance of the philosophical discipline and modality of thought more broadly. 
Continually waged over the past two-and-a-half millennia, philosophers fall over 
themselves trying to prove their projects more radical than those of their com-
petitors, and more drastic in their attempts to upset reified orthodoxies.
We can observe such anti-humanism in the structuralist Marxism of Louis Al-
thusser, whose authoritative position within the aforementioned university gave 
him considerable theoretical sway over many ensuing students. Althusser opposed 
the trend toward theoretical anti-humanism that he witnessed occurring in the 
French Communist Party, describing it as an “ideological” rather than “scientific” 
concept, insofar as it “really does designate a set of existing relations,” but cannot 
“provide us with a means of knowing them.”27 He dismissed the newly translated 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844—which had enabled scholars and 
activists to embrace a vision of Marx as humanist, concerned with the alienation 
of man’s species-being through the brutality of labour—as yet another manifesta-
tion of the bourgeois idealism peddled by philosophers from Kant onward. Inas-
much as the Manuscripts justified the primacy of the autonomous human subject 
as a means for masking social relations and thus enabling the normalization of 
labour exploitation, Althusser rejected the Hegelian and Feuerbachian legacy of 
humanism within Marx’s early works. 
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Drawing instead on the “epistemological break” of Marx’s 1845 German Ideology, 
Althusser aspires to develop a scientific form of Marxism that comprehends the 
subject as an epiphenomenal product of larger ideological structures, and of a his-
torical becoming-without-subject. As Knox Peden puts it, “Althusser’s heralding 
of science was less a return to a bygone positivism than the resurgence of a ratio-
nalism only briefly eclipsed during existentialism’s heyday in France,” adopting 
“Gaston Bachelard’s concept of the ‘epistemological break’ […] to describe both 
the moment that Marx took leave of the ideological humanism of his youth for the 
science of Capital, as well as the moment that any given subject moves from the 
terrain of ideology to the discourse of science tout court.”28 The conceptualization 
of a self-contained, self-sufficient, and autonomous science, sundered from all 
socio-empirical exigencies, was in effect the return to an Enlightenment rational-
ism valorizing the theoretical sciences above all else.
Moving away from the directly political concerns of Althusser’s work, but with 
a similar focus upon the illusory nature of the humanist subject, Jacques Derri-
da’s post-structuralist anti-humanism declares that even Heidegger is unable to 
escape the impediments of the humanism that he condemns, for his thought is 
“guided by the motif of Being as presence […] and by the motif of the proximity 
of Being to the essence of man,” such that “the thinking of the truth of Being, in 
the name of which Heidegger de-limits humanism and metaphysics, remains as 
thinking of man.”29 Heidegger’s attack on Sartre, in other words, remains within 
a metaphysics of presence that privileges the question of proximity between man 
and Being. Jacques Lacan (whose work on this question actually precedes that of 
Althusser), similarly denounces the notion of any self-present unity of the sub-
ject, instead foregrounding the scission that lies at the heart of subjectivity, and 
the according impossibility of unmediated reflection upon itself. Finally, Gilles 
Deleuze denounces “humanism’s exaltation of the human fact,” contending that 
the image of the self or ego is merely a stratified representation of a pure, uninhib-
ited encounter with the sense that precedes it, and which forms the condition of 
real experience.30 In all of these accounts, humanism is criticized for its reification 
of man as a concept synonymous with a self-present interiority of thought, and 
the concomitant occlusion of those various forces (e.g. relations of production, 
discourse, difference, etc.) that these anti-humanist philosophers view as provid-
ing the conditions that precede and exceed such a concept.
The anti-humanism of Foucault’s OT continues this line of critical inquiry, at-
tempting to identify the evident decomposition of humanism at the hands of 
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structuralism with that of a broader event occurring at the “archaeological” level 
of thought: the collapse of an epistemological configuration termed “man,” op-
erative as the transcendental condition of Western thought since the time of Im-
manuel Kant’s so-called “Copernican turn.” According to Foucault, man emerged 
at the close of the eighteenth century in the form of an “empirico-transcendental 
doublet”: at once as an object whose empirical finitude was “understood syntheti-
cally from empirical observation about the nature of human beings as living or 
speaking entities,” and a subject to be located at “the point of origin of every 
type of knowledge,”31 whose transcendental finitude could only be “analytically 
deduced” from the “transcendental as standpoint.”32 To be seen in this doublet 
form, then, is a simultaneous separation and unification of its two elements—the 
empirical and the transcendental—what has been termed man’s fundamental 
“ambiguity.”33
FOUCAULT AND THE DOUBLET
The emergence of man as doublet, placed at “the point of origin of every type of 
knowledge,”34 gives way to a newfound imposition of necessarily “interrogating 
man’s being as the foundation of all positivities,” “the basis of which all knowl-
edge could be constituted as immediate and non-problematized evidence.”35 But 
man was therefore also in a position to “become, a fortiori, that which justified 
the calling into question of all knowledge of man.”36 In the absence of an absolute 
transcendence within the ambiguous structure of the doublet, the transcendental 
remains to a certain degree “subject” to temporal subsumption by the empirical; 
that is, to a reversal in the critical formulation, whereby an empirical determina-
tion of man operates in the mode of a “pseudo-transcendental” condition of pos-
sibility of the transcendental itself.37 
According to Foucault, this potentiality manifests at the “surface level” in the 
problematic relation of the human sciences to that of science and philosophy re-
spectively, in the form of a “double and inevitable contestation”:
that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy between the sci-
ences of man and the sciences proper—the first laying an invincible claim 
to be the foundation of the second, which are ceaselessly obliged in turn 
to seek their own foundation, the justification of their method, and the 
purification of their history, in the teeth of ‘psychologism’, ‘sociologism’, 
and ‘historicism’; and that which lies at the root of the endless controversy 
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between philosophy, which objects to the naïveté with which the human 
sciences try to provide their own foundation, and those same human sci-
ences which claim as their rightful object what would formerly have con-
stituted the domain of philosophy.38
For Foucault, the “existence” and “untiring repetition” of these two particular re-
lations between the human sciences and science and philosophy respectively “for 
more than a century, do not indicate the permanence of an ever-open question; 
they refer back to [man as] a precise and extremely well-determined epistemo-
logical arrangement in history.”39 
It is the ambiguity inherent in this arrangement that, most worryingly for Fou-
cault, enables the human sciences to posit empirical determinations in the form 
of pseudo-transcendentals. As a result, insofar as each scientific endeavour is ei-
ther subject to the foundational claim of the human sciences, or (in what amounts 
to the same) actively seeking to determine its own conditions through recourse to 
psychologism, sociologism, etc., the “danger” of “tumbling over into the domain 
occupied by the human sciences”—the “danger of […] anthropologism” proper—
is ever-present.40 Likewise, in the case of philosophy, its “dangerous familiarity” 
with the human sciences enables a transition from the traditional, critical form 
of the relation between the empirical and transcendental—maintaining the lat-
ter’s claim to epistemological determinacy, as seen in Kant’s first Critique—to that 
of an “impure,” anthropological mode that “makes epistemic determination ulti-
mately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart.”41 
Anthropologization, according to Foucault, is “the great internal threat to knowl-
edge in our day” given its promotion of the empirical into the pseudo-transcen-
dental, and its consequent rendering of the transcendental-empirical relation 
into one of vicious circularity.42 The death of man as the death of a (post-)Kantian 
epistemic structure is thus an event to be welcomed for its occlusion of the pos-
sibility of anthropologizing thought in the first instance. In later contending that 
“the ambiguity of man as both subject and object […] no longer seem[ed …] a 
fruitful hypothesis, a fruitful theme for research”, Foucault was clearly figuring 
OT to be the last text of its type: a final anti-humanist manifesto of sorts deployed 
against the forces of anthropologization, and so effective on the historical scale.43
Now whilst OT gained much of its popular purchase from attempting to tie this 
particular configuration of philosophy, resultant from the recent invention of 
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“man” as doublet, to the local event of humanism’s decomposition, the reality 
of the situation (as Foucault’s subsequent minting in 1967 of modernity’s episte-
mological arrangement as “anthropologico-humanist” perhaps symptomatizes), 
is that the very relation between the problem of anthropologization and that of 
humanism was in fact very poorly articulated by Foucault, if at all.44 That is, de-
spite its centrality to the “death of man” thesis, precisely how Foucault’s critique 
of the anthropologization of modern thought translated into an effective critique 
of humanism proper remains—somewhat ironically given the aforementioned 
centrality of the notion to the text’s spectacular uptake in the humanism/anti-
humanism debate—almost entirely unaddressed by Foucault. As Han-Pile would 
have it, “The Order of Things has succeeded so well in narrowing the meaning of 
‘man’ to the empirico-transcendental double that the gap between ‘man’ and its 
humanist incarnations seems fairly unbridgeable. Yet for Foucault’s critique of 
anthropology to bite on humanism, such a gap needs to be bridged.”45
If one had failed to read Foucault’s tome closely, simply following (in the afore-
mentioned terms of Roudinesco) the media’s widespread substitution of the 
complexity of its account for a glorification of its “esotericity,” and its drawing of 
a direct causal link in this manner, the intervention of the media onto the stage 
of theory meant that one was in all likelihood able to confidently identify the 
collapse of humanism with the death of man. On the other hand, Foucault’s fail-
ure to provide “any explicit account of how the various humanist conceptions of 
man” were in fact related to his own account of man as “epistemic structure,” as 
ambiguous doublet, meant that to have effectively engaged with the text was to 
come away with little to no determinate means with which to effectively bridge 
Foucault’s critique of philosophy’s subjection to modernity’s anthropological 
configuration and his immense dissatisfaction with humanism proper.46
Within the charged socio-political context of 1960s Paris, it is clear how the for-
mer potentiality could override the latter. Despite the sheer difficulty and irregular 
structure of this “terrifically uncongenial” text—“rendering itself practically im-
penetrable to the lay reader”47—OT offered an irresistible expansion of the sense 
of radicality to be enjoyed from participating in a revolt against the philosophical 
humanism so dominant at the time. Such revolt had, to be sure, pre-existed the 
publication of OT in various forms,48 yet OT seemed to allow such participation 
in the local downfall of humanism and the most important thinker of post-war 
France in Sartre, to be identified with that of the broader collapse of a nearly two 
hundred year old arrangement governing the entirety of the human sciences and 
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philosophy as such. A serious questioning of the theoretical tenability of such a 
relation would therefore be confronted at each point by a number of interested 
parties: a sympathetic “readership” rejoicing in a newfound, expanded sense of 
revolt; a mass media seriously invested in maintaining that relation and so enter-
taining (knowingly or otherwise) the slippage of the term “man” within a largely 
vacuous, sloganistic formulation; not to mention a newly famous author symp-
tomatically casting the relation, as we’ve noted, as “anthropologico-humanist” in 
interviews subsequent to OT’s publication. 
In the glaring absence of Foucault’s explicit discussion of the problem, Han-Pile 
identifies three potential approaches through which a bridge could be construct-
ed, and their respective failures in each case. First, to entertain the idea of Fou-
cault’s having misread the humanist account of man in a manner analogous to 
Sartre’s aforementioned misreading of the “man” of OT seems somewhat disin-
genuous or “premature.”49 Second, to attempt to figure Sartrean man and OT’s 
man as in fact identical is even more problematic given, as we’ve seen, the wide 
disparity between the two notions. Finally, to have Foucault contend that human-
ism proper, and its conception of man in particular, remains determined by the 
epistemic structure that is “man,” faces three challenges.50
Firstly, the “slippage” of anthropologization was shown by OT to be a “typical” 
but by no means “necessary” philosophical manoeuvre. Even though the afore-
mentioned “contestation” between the human sciences and philosophy was, 
according to Foucault, “inevitable” under the epistemological arrangement of 
“man,” the option remained open at all times for philosophical abstinence from 
the “confusion of the empirical and the transcendental.”51 As Foucault’s earlier, 
posthumously published Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology—submitted in 1961 
as a minor thesis and widely understood as the precursor to OT—illustrates, phi-
losophy could and indeed did maintain itself in a critical rather than anthropolo-
gized mode (in the form of Kant’s first Critique) meaning that “there is no reason 
to think that the empirico-transcendental structure” in the form of doublet, “is 
intrinsically flawed” (a point Laruelle will seriously contest below).52 It is thus 
important to note that Foucault’s approach remains in this sense a fundamentally 
critical one; that one must identify OT as an extension, an attempt to shore-up the 
fundamental components of the strictly critical modality of philosophy.53  More-
over, and at the risk of further saturating this case of the philosophical divide be-
tween humanism and anti-humanism with irony, Han-Pile points out that Sartre’s 
early phenomenology in fact constitutes “a type of humanism more aware of the 
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dangers of anthropology and keen to preserve the separation of the empirical and 
the transcendental.”54 A hermetic enclosure indeed.
Secondly, what Han-Pile identifies as the “implicit normativity of Foucault’s anal-
ysis,” or more precisely its vacillation between the neutral presentation of the 
“surface effects” of a given epistemological configuration, and an explicit isola-
tion of humanism as the most pernicious of such surface effects—a gesture only 
further exaggerated in Foucault’s engagement with the media following the pub-
lication of OT—seriously problematizes the “apodictic” aspirations of Foucault’s 
archaeological approach and its findings, given that it leaves Foucault open to 
the humanist charge that he “did not practice what he preached, and that his dis-
course was no less normative than theirs.”55
Finally, in utilizing the evident decomposition of humanism—“due in large mea-
sure to the structuralist development”—to substantiate the archaeological claim 
regarding the death of man as epistemic structure, Foucault falls into a viciously 
circular argument.56 He cannot deduce this demise from the mutation of Western 
thought’s epistemic structure, so far as such a mutation remains undetermined 
within his account (hence the empirical course to humanism’s decomposition as 
“evidence”). Foucault can only take past epistemic mutations as precedents for 
upcoming ones, not as sufficient causes, meaning that the death of man strictly 
exists only as a possibility in OT, subject to what Foucault terms his purely descrip-
tive discourse’s “problem of causes,”57 and so the object of what is strictly a “wa-
ger” that man is “perhaps nearing its end”.58 Yet of greater concern is that to utilize 
the evident decomposition of humanism in such a way would be to replicate the 
anthropological manoeuvre that his archaeological analysis works so hard to di-
agnose and so condemn, for:
if one takes seriously the characterization of ‘man’ as the historical a priori 
which has formed the condition of possibility of knowledge since the end 
of the eighteenth century, then the logic which consists in using empirical 
observations to infer its disappearance is somewhat dubious: by defini-
tion, transcendental conditions are immune to empirical refutation.59
One could retort, Han-Pile continues, that the historical dimension of man as 
epistemic structure (the “historical a priori” of modernity) leaves it open to mod-
ification by “empirical changes”—with the spectacular advent of OT’s publication 
perhaps being amongst them—but to do so would still be to privilege the causal 
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mode of determination characteristic of the empirical over that of the epistemic 
determination of the transcendental, and thus in a manner that can only be seen 
as replicating the anthropological manoeuvre.60 Intriguingly, and perhaps most im-
portantly for our discussion below, if Foucault’s critique were to indeed be guilty 
in this sense it could therefore “be seen as a further development (rather than a 
way out)” of thought’s anthropologization: “‘man’ may have a greater life expec-
tancy than anticipated.”61 Foucault’s attempt to supplement OT’s structural in-
ability to clear its final hurdle by rhetorically tying the anthropological to the hu-
manist (both within OT and, as we’ve shown, in the public domain more broadly) 
not only left him just as guilty of capitalizing on the hazy figuration of “man” in 
the death of man debate as his interlocutors, but more worryingly had him mir-
roring these despised objects of his enquiry.
Although it would be too simplistic to present it as a mere response or rebuke to 
this Foucauldian account, the non-humanism of François Laruelle intervenes at 
precisely this point of failed identification between the death of man and the fall 
of humanism, and the hermetic enclosure of the philosophical that it exhibits. 
Foucault’s response to humanism (in addition to those of his various anti-human-
ist contemporaries) is simply not sufficient for Laruelle, from whose perspective 
they would appear to still remain too humanist (or perhaps more precisely, too phi-
losophistic, which remains in effect a residual humanism), whilst simultaneously 
and paradoxically not humanist enough. 
LARUELLE’S CRITIQUE OF BOTH HUMANISTS AND ANTI-HUMANISTS
The problem is that as much as these philosophers present themselves as having 
undermined the mythology of the unitary philosophical subject, they still remain 
attached to the fundamental Parmenidean axiom that “thought and being are the 
Same.”62 In all of these accounts it is the philosopher who is able to think beyond 
the merely epiphenomenal representation of the subject as a unitary entity. As a 
consequence, this figure of the philosopher—“the human par excellence in speak-
ing, knowing, acting” is posited as the individual who is able to think the real in the 
synthesis of empirical, everyday experience with the category of being that both 
conditions it and legislates over it.63 Thus, regardless of any philosopher’s specific 
position in regard to subjectivity, there is still a unitary locus of thought present, 
insofar as the philosopher presumes it possible to think the real in the terms that 
she or he has established. This is what Laruelle refers to as the claimed sufficiency 
of philosophy, whereby it is assumed that all is philosophizable, thus universaliz-
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ing philosophical thought in relation to the real.64 Whilst the anti-humanisms of 
these thinkers (Althusser, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, etc.) are accepted by 
Laruelle as in earnest, he questions the extent to which anti-humanism as such is 
capable of escaping a broader philosophism that still presupposes the primacy of 
thought qua being: “the confusion of One and of Being.”
At the same time though, it would seem that these approaches are still not actu-
ally humanist enough by Laruelle’s standards—or more precisely, he claims that 
they are still unable to think man, the human individual, in a rigorous and scien-
tific sense. “Philosophy such as it exists, precisely because it can be an anthro-
pology, does not know man,” he writes, “it knows the inhuman, the sub-human, 
the too-human, the overman, but it doesn’t know the human.”65 Unlike Foucault, 
Laruelle has no intention of defending philosophy against the human sciences. 
Instead, his project of non-philosophy seeks to defend man—“ordinary man,” as 
he refers to it, who “really exists, and is really distinct from the World”—against 
both of these fields of study, because in his view philosophy, anthropology, sociol-
ogy, psychology and so on and so forth all think something other than man.66 In 
contrast to these seemingly failed approaches, Laruelle attempts to identify ordi-
nary man as a radically finite, immanent individual, irreducible in his multiplicity 
and irreplaceable in his singularity. 
Philosophy, Laruelle contends, regardless of where specific philosophers see 
themselves as sitting on the humanist/anti-humanist divide, is guided by a de-
sire to universalize itself by identifying the All, or totality (i.e. that which exists, 
which is, under the aegis of being) with the real. Philosophy thinks man, and thus 
thought, in terms of being (or whatever manifestation this category takes within a 
particular philosophy). In effect, philosophy tries to couple man to its universals. 
On this point, Laruelle writes:
[i]t identifies man with generalities or attributes, with a knowledge, an 
activity, a race, a desire, an existence, a writing, a society, a sex; and it is 
once more the philosopher who pushes himself forward behind the mask 
of these generalities—the philosopher requisitioning man in the service of 
his aims and his values, which are very specific but which need the cover 
of the universal.67
The result is that philosophy conflates the lived experience of the ordinary man with 
the universalized and abstract category of being, such that the former remains un-
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thought by philosophy, because its real conditions are filtered through these uni-
versals.
Founded upon a “mixture and parallelism of man and logos,” philosophy is a mode 
of discourse, and accordingly its (linguistic) communicability must be assured: 
it is a basic principle of philosophy, albeit an unspoken one, that truth must be 
communicable through philosophical categories.68 This blending of man and logos 
means that rather than beginning with the solitary, contemplative individual, phi-
losophy instead is formed in the mixture-form of two concepts: man and being. 
With this in mind, we can then frame the divide between humanism and anti-hu-
manism that we explored earlier in this article. Whereas the former understands 
these two terms as synonymous (such that for Sartre, man is characterized by his 
being-for-itself and being-for-others), the latter demotes man in the name of be-
ing, revealing that man is in fact the product of some other substance or impetus 
(for the Foucault of OT, man is nothing but the “reduction […] to the structures 
within which he is contained”).69 For the anti-humanists then, man as concept is 
doubled between the vulgar empirical experience of the individual as given, and 
the superior forces that underpin this representation (as givenness): a relation-
ship that only the philosopher can apparently perceive and synthesize.
Non-philosophy, in contrast, claims to be founded upon the truth and essence 
of man as the real, not merely as a being that resides within it. It is a “question of 
treating, from the start, the real in the strict sense as philosophically unengen-
dered or non-constituted.”70 The first consequence, and the most basic axiom 
of non-philosophy is not so much that man exists (this is what philosophy tells 
us), but that man is already-given: the individual does not require the givenness 
of being, for they are determined and complete from the outset. This ordinary 
individual is both finite and inalienable. It is undivided and indivisible, preced-
ing all forms of claimed universality, for as Laruelle notes, “all these universals 
[…] do not amount to even the most modest beginnings of a specific science of 
man, distinct from the science of historical man, speaking man, social man, psychi-
cal man, etc.”71 The ordinary man does not need philosophy, for he is not alienated 
or in need of rescue, to identify the being that lies unrecognized either within or 
beneath him. Laruelle notes:
science must be unique and specific if it would be a real science and cease 
to be a techno-political phantasm; and it is man who must be irreducible 
in his multiplicity if he would cease to be this anthropological fetish, this 
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somewhat drab phantom that is but the shadow of the Human Sciences, 
that is to say of the self-screening light of Reason.72
The unusual corollary of this is that the All is not all: man does not belong to the 
world, man is introduced into it, and is distinct from it. The real is not the same 
as the world, for non-philosophy identifies the latter as given specifically through 
philosophy. The non-philosophical project therefore manifests as a rather odd 
mode of humanism (a “non-humanism,” as we should probably refer to it, follow-
ing Laruelle’s own pattern) that seeks to think a generic, rather than merely pos-
sible reality of man: man as the One, rather than as being (in either the ontological 
or ontical sense).
THOUGHT ACCORDING TO THE ONE
The purpose of non-philosophy, proclaims Laruelle, is to think the radical im-
manence of the One, but to avoid doing so in philosophical terms, which would 
seek to think it in other terms, as we have already seen; instead, he claims that non-
philosophy thinks “the One insofar as it succeeds Being as well as the Other and 
Difference as the principal theme of thought.”73 The One, as synonymous with 
both the real and the ordinary man, is entirely foreclosed to thought as an object 
of knowledge: we do not, and cannot think about the One, he argues, without re-
ducing it to the Other (as occurs in philosophy, which posits the real as thinkable 
through the transcendent givenness of being, and thus idealizes the conditions of 
its thought). Philosophy, although it usually asserts its capacity to think the real 
in itself, does not allow the real to act, for it attempts to know it (and thus inter-
pret it) in specifically philosophical terms, and thus categorically reduces the real 
to the representational structure of decision, in which the real is divided between 
an empirical and an ideal component. Man is thus cleaved between his everyday 
experience of the world and the category of being through which this experience 
is both conditioned and judged.
Whereas philosophy is dependent upon a reversible causality between being and 
the real, such that the latter can only be thought on the basis of a synthesis of 
the a priori and the empirical (an act of mediation between transcendence and 
immanence of which only the philosopher is capable), Laruelle instead remains 
committed to an understanding of the real as both radically immanent and ut-
terly inaccessible to thought. Man is, in his account, foreclosed as an object of 
thought. This real, the ordinary man, the non-philosophical One, is not a being, 
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nor a vector of becoming. It is not in any way manifest, and contains no tran-
scendence, division, exteriority, or negativity. It is a unity, but does not, as in 
the case of the empirico-transcendental doublet, unify differences within itself 
(which would make it unitary—a cardinal distinction in Laruellian terminology). 
It is given-without-givenness; that which is already-given prior to all thought, that 
which is immanent only to itself and in itself. Unlike prior philosophers, whose 
ideas demand communicability, the One does not need to be described in any 
manner. For non-philosophy then, we don’t attempt to think about the One, nor 
even to describe—for in trying to do this, we inevitably represent it as an object 
in a manner that would make it determinable by thought—but rather, we think 
according to the One.
This, then, is not a humanism premised upon the attempt to know or understand 
what the human being is; on the contrary, it is based upon a force of thought im-
manent to man, unalienated by the transcendence of philosophical categories. To 
think about philosophy from the finitude of the One, and thus of man in his most 
ordinary form—a perspective that Laruelle refers to as vision-in-One, and which 
“determines non-philosophy […] as a positive practice of philosophy rather than 
as something that would subtract itself from philosophy’s self-sufficiency”—is to 
think it from a perspective which suspends its sufficiency in order to treat it as inert 
“material.”74 Philosophy thus provides non-philosophy with the data from which 
it operates, transformed into simple phenomena, the latter operating through a 
mode of thought appropriate to the real, and where philosophy “can no longer be 
the presupposition (in the traditional sense) of this thought,” for “it is only its pre-
supposition without auto-position,” relative to the real.75 Suddenly, philosophy 
finds itself no longer in a position of presumed sufficiency (and hence primacy), 
but instead, on an equal footing with those regional (i.e. extra-philosophical) phe-
nomena over which it once claimed dominion. The “auto-decoupage of the philo-
sophical body,” surrounding it with the trophies of those extra-philosophical on-
tologies over which its superiority is given and self-evident, is utterly suspended.76
The object of non-philosophy is therefore not experience, but these various re-
gional knowledges and practices with which such experience is given and situ-
ated, presenting itself as a transcendental modality of thought in relation to these 
knowledges.77 Its purpose is “to deprive philosophy of its transcendental claim 
over the real and to tightly fasten it to experience,” such that philosophy becomes 
the simple a priori of all possible experience.78 All philosophy attempts to think 
the real (and hence the One, for the real is always thought philosophically in a 
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unitary manner), but when thought from the perspective of vision-in-One, what 
is revealed is the way in which this attempt actually stymies the heterogeneity of 
thought, for the latter (in its non-philosophical guise) is not a being, but rather, 
determines-in-the-last-instance all thought of being. The non-philosophical One, 
unlike the categories of philosophical transcendence, cannot be exhausted or 
alienated, for it is in all cases already-given. It is not an excess, it does not over-
flow. Likewise, as we have already seen, whilst we can attempt to describe the One 
(either non-philosophically through axioms, or philosophically through decision), 
the One has no need of this description in order for it to be real. When we speak of 
ordinary individuals, we are speaking of “real essences, lived in experiences that 
are pre-political, pre-linguistic, etc.—true immediate givens.”79 Determination-
in-the-last-instance is thus the unilateral determination of philosophy by the One. 
This determination, which forms the transcendental condition for philosophy as 
material, is entirely irreversible: philosophy does not determine the real at all. Ob-
serves Alexander Galloway:
Laruelle’s “last” is not a chronological last, nor is it “last” like a trump 
card (which is always played last). It is a messianic last. Laruelle’s last 
philosophy is last only in the sense of “the last instance,” an immanent 
and finite last-ness that trumps nothing, supersedes nothing, and indeed 
is not a “meditation” at all in the proper sense of the term as reflection-on 
or consciousness-of. Rather, Laruelle’s in-the-last-instance means roughly 
“in the most generic sense”. Laruelle’s messianism is therefore neither an-
cient nor modern, neither special nor particular. But merely generic. The 
last, the least, the finite.80
Non-philosophy aims “to refuse philosophy its principal pretension and to be en-
titled to say that it does not reach the real, even if necessarily maintaining certain 
relations with it.”81 Not to negate or revolt against philosophy, nor to replace it, 
but to bring it down a peg or two, so to speak. The causal (non-)relationship thus 
established, whereby the One gives philosophy without philosophy giving it any-
thing in return is referred to as a unilateral duality. Truth, in a non-philosophical 
sense, is not a knowledge, a concept, an intuition, or a mode of phenomenological 
perception—it is a process of thought that gives-without-givenness. It is a truth, 
Laruelle argues, involving a radical indifference to the world, premised upon a 
real which is “absolutely distinct from and even indifferent to empirico-ideal real-
ity,” and thus the effectivity of philosophical decision.82
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It is important to note at this point that the One, in its non-philosophical mani-
festation, is not the totality of all that exists (the solipsistic or sophistic position), 
for existence itself (i.e. the state of being) is a philosophical category. Philosophy, 
as we have already witnessed, is characterized by the Parmenidean conflation of 
thought and being: the presumption that all is by its very nature philosophizable. 
Accordingly, whilst it was only Kant who first explicitly identified and formalized 
this connection, making being inseparable from thought through the identifica-
tion of an unknowable thing-in-itself that literally cannot be thought, and thus 
identifying a realm apparently unable to be colonized by philosophical ideality—a 
position that Quentin Meillassoux infamously designates correlationism, “the idea 
according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking 
and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”—it would 
seem that, contra Foucault, this suture is not necessarily an innovation in Kant’s 
critical project: all philosophy, in its mixture of the empirical and the ideal, neces-
sitates the codetermination of thought and being.83 Kant merely uses this identi-
fication in order to shore up his own credentials, and those of philosophy more 
broadly: it is only the philosopher, he infers, who is able to at least somewhat re-
sist the temptations of reason and keep him or herself wedded to the true objects 
of knowledge.
The real, writes Laruelle, is “like Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself ’: unknowable and even 
unthinkable, but with the difference that it is not so from transcendence but from 
immanence (the One and not the Other) foreclosed.”84 Non-philosophy seeks to 
pull apart the Parmenidean (correlationist) ligature, such that thought becomes 
the necessary condition of being. The result is that the One and the real are best 
understood as the inalienable and immanent identity of the individual human 
ego: “[n]on-philosophy ‘postulates’ that the Ego is already revealed through-and-
through in its proper mode before the manifestation of being and thought.”85 This 
does not mean, however, that the One is equivalent to the transcendental sub-
ject of post-Kantian philosophy; conversely, the subject, from the perspective of 
force-(of)-thought, is determined-in-the-last-instance by the ego, and it is this 
ego—the ordinary man—that we understand as the One.
Non-philosophy is, therefore, an attempt to develop a new theory of man: one in 
which the ordinary individual exists as the radically immanent, necessary but in-
sufficient condition of all thought. This individual is human but also non-human, 
in that they are foreclosed to all thought, all language, and all representation that 
might ascribe the qualities we would normally associate with the human being 
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upon them. Man, according to this account, is just an axiom, rather than a con-
cept or the object of a concept. We do not describe him, but we act as him. The 
ordinary, inalienable man, as distinct from the world which philosophy claims he 
inhabits, is the real. The ego precedes being and thought. The result, in summary, 
is an odd brand of humanism: one that seeks to preserve the individuality of the 
ordinary man by foreclosing our ability to speak of him—refusing to allow man to 
be reduced to an object of knowledge. The One, as the ordinary man, is that which 
is unspeakable, incommunicable, and thus unphilosophizable, but which forms 
the necessary but insufficient condition for philosophy. Rather than claiming a 
knowledge of man, non-philosophy provides an “ignorance where natural, popu-
lar consciousness inheres,” prioritizing the emergence of thought in its diversity 
and multiplicity over its colonization by philosophy.86
LARUELLE AND FOUCAULT
From this discussion above, Laruelle can be seen to figure his approach in a man-
ner parallel to that of Foucault, offering not only a diagnosis of the problems at 
hand, but in turn attempting to actively participate in the very process of mutat-
ing thought, to effect a transition from the circularity of “the unitary paradigm.”87 
Accordingly, he clearly echoes a number of concerns central to OT, such as that 
of the circularity inimical to the doublet form, the philosophical proximity to the 
anthropological, and the threats posed by the human sciences in particular to 
science. Yet it is in this last instance that the point of differentiation between 
the two is perhaps most clear, as articulated in Laruelle’s declaration that “[w]e 
shall not take up the old combat: defending philosophy against the human scienc-
es”—or what, in OT, would equate to a defence of the critical formulation of phi-
losophy against the anthropological slippage—“[r]ather, we defend man against 
this authoritarian family in league against him.”88 More specifically, Laruelle shed 
some further light on the relation between his non-humanism and OT in a recent 
interview, when noting the moment in which 
little by little, I identified the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, and above 
all its form, its expression […] the doublet form of philosophy. Foucault 
identified a transcendental-empirical doublet. But that’s not all—there is 
a second, transcendental-real, doublet, which we can see at work in Kant, 
in Heidegger. There are two doublets, three or four terms.89 
.
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In so adopting the doublet form and extending it beyond Foucault’s compara-
tively localized critique to philosophy tout court in the form of the principle of 
sufficient philosophy, of philosophy’s reliance on the reciprocal determination 
of two “partially undetermined” parameters or “terms,”90 Foucault’s own posi-
tion—or, more specifically, his struggle in attempting to bridge his account of the 
death of man as epistemic structure to the decomposition of humanism—would 
come under the purview of this principle. This is to be seen, we contend, in what 
would amount to Laruelle’s responses to each of the three aforementioned chal-
lenges OT would face in attempting to bridge the gap between the death of man 
as epistemic structure, and the evident demise of humanism—what, we contend, 
equates in each instance to an effective “trumping” of Foucault’s response in this 
particular book to humanism. 
Firstly, the ongoing tenability of the doublet structure in philosophy, only en-
tertained in OT through an emphasis of its potential but not necessary enabling 
of an anthropological inversion of the critical formulation (and thus limited to 
post-Kantian philosophy), is maintained by Laruelle’s expansion of the range of 
doublet form so as to figure the circular, self-sufficient manoeuvre of reciprocal 
determination (regardless of a particular philosophy’s “terms”) to be characteris-
tic of the philosophical, as the primary symptom of unitary thought. Furthermore, 
the fact that, as Han-Pile points out, Sartre’s early phenomenology constitutes “a 
type of humanism more aware of the dangers of anthropology and keen to pre-
serve the separation of the empirical and the transcendental,”91 strengthens Laru-
elle’s point regarding the hermetic nature of philosophical revolt in this sense, 
with revolt remaining precisely philosophical.92
Secondly, the “implicit normativity” of Foucault’s analysis, opening it to a pos-
sible charge of formally mirroring the humanist manoeuvre of reifying the image 
of man as synonymous with a self-present interiority of thought, finds a drastic 
rebuttal in Laruelle’s suspension of philosophy’s auto-position and auto-dona-
tion, not only figuring philosophy as just another regional knowledge, but safely 
avoiding the privileging of man in his rendering the latter entirely foreclosed to, 
and in a position of unilateral determination with, thought proper.
These previous two points come to combine in the third Laruellian response to 
the challenges faced by OT. The fact that the circular relation articulated between 
the evident fall of humanism (an empirical matter) and the transcendental matter 
of the death of man as epistemic structure replicates the very structure of anthro-
human-in-the-last-instance?· 305 
pologization by effectively inverting the critical relation between the empirical 
events and their transcendental conditions, would seem to, again, validate the 
Laruellian diagnosis of the philosophical as always-already operative in line with 
the principle of sufficient philosophy. That even in an attempt to exit from the 
philosophical arrangement that forms the philosophical object of its philosophical 
critique, philosophy cannot help but repeat the fundamental components of the 
latter’s gesture. If, as Han-Pile contends, man as epistemic structure, as empirico-
transcedental doublet, can indeed then expect a greater life expectancy than be-
stowed upon him by the closing wager of OT, Laruelle would not be in a position 
to disagree; indeed, he needn’t do so, for in bestowing upon “his” “ordinary man” 
a lengthy lifespan, philosophy and the epistemic structure that determines it (and 
its particular treatment of man) continues on resigned to the level of regional 
knowledges, determined in the last instance by a real entirely foreclosed to it.
  
CONCLUSION
Laruelle thus offers not only an innovative (although obviously still highly con-
testable) means for analysing philosophical doxa, but also an important and time-
ly provocation regarding the place of man in philosophy, and in discourse more 
generally: in short, non-philosophy asks whether in trying so hard to categorize, 
classify, and circumscribe the attributes of the human being, we have consistently 
failed to embrace the full possibilities of human thought, inasmuch as they are 
irreducible to the adjectival idiom of philosophical communication. Although in 
this article we have focused chiefly upon his analysis within a single essay (‘A 
Rigorous Science of Man’) from his Philosophy II period, we nonetheless believe 
that the tendencies identified manifest, in a roughly consistent manner, across his 
oeuvre.93 In Principles of Non-Philosophy, for instance, the key text of Philosophy 
III (the subsequent period in which he would self-consciously attempt to expunge 
non-philosophy of its more crudely scientistic impulses), Laruelle describes one 
of his objectives to be the “democratic humanization of thought,” placing “the 
Real at the heart of man or man at the heart of the Real rather than one at the 
periphery of the other as philosophy itself does.”94
Across the variegations of Laruelle’s writings, what does remain stable is his com-
mitment to this humanism or humanization, and the attendant desire to develop 
a true science of man: man as the Name-of-Man, a generic humanity; man as the 
Stranger-subject, gazing dispassionately toward the world; man as Man-in-per-
son, the identity in the last instance of all religious experience; man as the Christ-
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subject, the saviour of the world from the world; man as Man-without-Essence, 
foreclosed of alienation; man as Victim-in-person, the necessary but insufficient 
condition for any justice; even man as uni-sexual, irreducible in the last instance 
to all sexual differentiation. As he puts it in Anti-Badiou (from Philosophy V, the 
most recent period of his work), non-philosophy replaces all philosophical hier-
archies “with a defense, in every case, of humans, and not of philosophy,” and comple-
mentarily, “the universal defense of humans qua generic subjects, a principle of 
minimizing the inevitable harm done to philosophy and to the modes of thought 
that are subordinate to it.”95 This is a celebration of humanity as always already 
given-in-Man.
At the same time though, further discussion is still needed, reflecting upon the 
occlusions that potentially exist within this project and might jeopardize its pro-
posed (non-)humanism and its engagement with the broader debate surrounding 
humanism and the status of man. For Laruelle’s identification of the One—that 
within which all ontologies, discourses, knowledges, and practices find their iden-
tity in the last instance—with the human would seem to be in its own right a form 
of decision (even taking into account non-philosophy’s self-professed reliance on 
a contingent philosophical lexicon in order to support its own practice) that is 
in some sense fatally arbitrary in its investment of the Laruellian real “with a 
minimal degree of ontological consistency,”96 so compromising any subsequent 
championing of a truly generic Real, stripped of all philosophical attributes.
This constitutes the key dissatisfaction for Ray Brassier in his treatment of the 
Laruellian project (with which he sympathizes, but of which he is also highly 
critical). Brassier draws attention to a fundamental distinction, elsewhere upheld 
in Laruelle’s work, between claiming to be “identical-in-the-last-instance with,” 
“think[ing] in accordance with” or having “my thinking […] determined-in-the-
last instance by [the real],” and that of actually being “the real qua One.”97 For 
Brassier, “[t]o privilege, as Laruelle does, the irrecusability of the ‘name-of-man’ 
over and above the contingency of other occasional nominations of the last-
instance, is effectively to confuse the real with its symbol,”98 and to do so in a 
manner, we might add, formally comparable to the aforementioned instance of 
“implicit normativity” to be seen in Foucault’s archaeological analysis, where the 
neutral presentation of the “surface effects” of a given epistemological configura-
tion is abandoned for an explicit isolation of humanism as the most pernicious of 
such surface effects. Strictly speaking, “[w]hat I think I am can have no privilege 
vis-à-vis the identity of a real already given independently of anything I may hap-
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pen to think about it,”99 if the identity of the real as entirely foreclosed to such a 
determination is to maintain this fundamental “characteristic” as such, just as the 
fall of a pernicious humanism cannot be isolated as the preeminent instance of a 
mutation at the archaeological level of epistemological configurations, if the level 
of apodictic neutrality aspired to in the archaeological approach, is to be upheld.
The descriptive power and broader cogency afforded their respective projects by 
Laruelle and Foucault’s approaches of ‘neutrality’ with respect to their respective 
‘objects,’ is thus compromised in both instances upon attempting to enter into 
and, in doing so, actively resolve the debate surrounding humanism. The speci-
ficity of the normative claim upon which such an entry is rendered relevant si-
multaneously and immediately threatens to shatter the broader cogency of the 
archaeological and non-philosophical systems respectively, at the precise point 
they each attempt to become an active participant in the debate. The respectively 
apodictic and “scientific” aspirations of Foucault’s and Laruelle’s responses to 
the debate surrounding humanism thus seem to constitute the price of entry in 
the first instance, suggesting we must constantly take stock of the points at which 
such theories fall back into the philosophical tendencies that they each claim to 
suspend.
—University of Melbourne
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